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Abstract 
 
In the framework of Cognitive Approach, this paper proposes a new method to identify 
strategic groups (SG) using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methods. Two 
assumptions are maintained in the SG literature: first, firms grouped together value 
inputs and outputs similarly, and, second, some degree of stability in those valuations 
should be identified. Virtual weights obtained from DEA are extremely useful in the 
valuation of the strategic variables, but a problem emerges when longitudinal analysis is 
performed. This problem is addressed by defining a long run DEA evaluation. SGs are 
determined by means of Cluster Analysis, using virtual outputs and virtual inputs as 
variables and Spanish savings banks as observations. The traditional method of 
determining SGs by clustering on the original variables is also applied and the results 
are compared. It is shown that the long run DEA weights approach has advantages over 
the traditional methodology. 
 
 
Keywords: banking, cognitive groups, Data Envelopment Analysis, stable strategic time periods, strategic 
groups 
JEL Classification: C61, D24, G21, L11 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
∗ Los autores quieren agradecer el respaldo financiero del Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (royecto # 
SEC2003-04770), del Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (proyecto # SEJ2006-01731); y de la 
Comunidad de Madrid y Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. (Proyecto # UC3M-ECO-05-042). Las 
opiniones de los autores son de su entera responsabilidad. 
 
1 Diego Prior Jiménez. Catedrático del Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona 08193 Cerdañola (Barcelona), España. Tel.: +34-93 581 15 39 Fax: +34-93-581 25 55. diego.prior@uab.es 
2 Jordi Surroca Aguilar. Profesor Visitante del Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid 28903 Getafe (Madrid), España. Tel.: +34-91 624 86 40 Fax: +34-91 624 96 07. jsurroca@emp.uc3m.es 
 1
INTRODUCTION 
One crucial question in the field of strategy is why firms in the same industry perform 
differently. Strategic Group (hereafter SG) literature proposes an answer to this question: the 
differences in the collective behavior of the SGs lead to durable differences in profitability. 
The problem is that, for empirical and theoretical reasons, research on SGs has been 
somewhat unsatisfactory. From the empirical point of view, no conclusive evidence has been 
found for the hypothesized group-performance linkage (McGee and Thomas, 1986; Thomas 
and Venkatraman, 1988; Barney and Hoskisson, 1990), and most part of the research has 
been limited to the static (specific to a given time-period) identification of SGs. As Cool and 
Schendel (1987) pointed out, this static viewpoint implies that the observed SGs and the 
differences in their profitability are invariant. As this assumption is problematic, it is 
imperative for a longitudinal expansion of the analysis because, as Hatten and Hatten (1987) 
pointed out, unless some degree of stability would be identified, the very concept of an SG 
had little value. 
On the theoretical side, some authors (e.g. Cool and Schendel, 1987) state the limited 
progress achieved in the acceptance of the concept of SG based on industrial organization 
theory. This has led to new theoretical approaches, namely the cognitive perspective 
(Fombrun and Zajac, 1987; Osborne et al., 2001; Peng et al., 2004; Porac et al., 1995; Reger 
and Huff, 1993) or the resource determinants of performance differences (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989; Mehra, 1996). In particular, cognitive approach theorists suggest that managers have 
cognitive or perceptual maps of intra-industry structure (Bogner and Thomas, 1993) 
establishing different SGs from those obtained under the industrial organization approach 
(Reger and Huff, 1993). Differences and similarities between both approaches have been 
included in the integrative model developed by Bogner and Thomas (1993), who concluded 
that competition and performance are influenced more directly by cognitive perceptions of 
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SGs than by industrial organization groupings. Although limited empirical evidence have 
been found, it proves that strategic groups formed according to manager’s perceptions 
predicts better the performance differences across firms in a particular industry (Reger and 
Huff, 1993).  
The cognitive approach implies difficulties for researchers due to the fact that mental 
patterns of managers are rarely visible for external observers. Therefore, researchers have 
tried to use simple approximations to cognitive models. For instance, Peng et al. (2004) have 
demonstrated that the ownership is a powerful criterion to predict the existence of SGs. 
Although remaining relatively unexplored, another criterion for identifying cognitive groups 
may be the production function approach (Athanassopoulos, 2003; Day et al., 1995, and Prior 
and Surroca, 2006). Day et al. (1995) pointed out that, when designing strategies, managers 
cognize a causal model relating operational decisions with the attainment of an objective 
function that, in general, includes multiple goals. This causality, in the very definition of 
strategy, justifies the need to identify the characteristics of the production function that maps 
resources to the attainment of the strategic goals.  
In this paper, we focus on the production function and, more specifically, on the 
relative importance managers place on specific key decision variables – the marginal inputs 
and marginal outputs rates. These variables represent the rate of contribution of each key 
decision variable to the general corporate strategy (Thanassoulis, 1996). Therefore, our 
proposal consists of grouping together firms according to the similarities their managers’ 
place over key decision variables. Concerning SGs literature using the production function 
approach, Prior and Surroca (2006) have defined cross-sectional Data Envelopment Analysis 
(hereafter DEA) models to determine marginal inputs and outputs rates, but it remains to be 
defined the longitudinal extension of the analysis in order to fulfil a dynamic analysis on the 
SGs. In order to do this, an idiosyncratic DEA problem must first be addressed: the lack of 
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time-consistency of the information obtained from the contemporaneous production 
functions. We apply our proposal to the Spanish savings bank industry over the period 1998-
02, and, once SGs have been determined, we assess the impact of SG membership on firm 
performance. A comparison between our SG configuration vis-à-vis that derived from 
standard clustering firms on the basis of similarities in key decision variables is also 
performed, and the results of this analysis show the advantages of using our cognitive 
approach. 
Three main contributions can be distinguished from our work. First, we propose a 
simple criterion for identifying cognitive groups based on the concept of production frontier. 
Specifically, the information provided by production frontier helps us to approximate 
managers’ mental models. Secondly, we provide evidence in favor of the cognitive approach. 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, this article presents and discusses the 
advantages of the definition of a DEA model focused on the long-run evaluation.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we establish the 
connection between cognitive SGs and DEA. Building on this connection, in the 
methodological section we extend DEA frontier model to define a new long-run DEA 
evaluation that offers a stable common set of virtual weights for each unit, which is the basis 
for identifying SGs. Next, we describe the sample, the strategic variables and the stages we 
follow to finally determine the SGs in the Spanish savings bank industry. The article 
concludes discussing the findings and presenting the significance of the study. 
LINKING COGNITIVE GROUPS AND DEA-PRODUCTION FRONTIERS  
In industries populated by so many competitors, the individual consideration of each 
one is impossible and managers tend to summarize competitors’ strategies (Porac et al., 
1995). In such cases, decision-makers tend to simplify the original information into abstract 
categories and, subsequently, to elaborate new information sets aimed to condense the 
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existent knowledge (Reger and Huff, 1993). Thus, a complex cognitive analytical context is 
translated into a tractable cognitive problem. Cognitive simplification and elaboration leads 
managers to develop categories to which they assign firms: if managers of different firms 
share a common cognitive structure they consider each other as rival, and a group identity 
emerges (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). Therefore, according to the cognitive approach, a 
strategic group is considered to be a set of firms whose decision-makers hold shared mental 
models of strategy within their industry (Reger and Huff, 1993).  
With respect to collective behavior, a distinctive feature of cognitive groups is that 
managers perceive competing firms to be similar on a basis of important strategic dimensions 
(Porac et al., 1995; Reger and Huff, 1993). Rather than searching for a universal and 
exhaustive taxonomy of firms, managers isolate only those strategic dimensions that are 
viewed as critical (Porac et al., 1995). From this perspective, firms’ activities are conceived 
as a limited number of central dimensions – the competitive priorities – that are particularly 
informative and predictable of overall organizational activities.  
In a complex context, managers observe SGs by means of the specific type of 
relationships among the competitive priorities and with the other strategic dimensions (Porac 
and Thomas, 1990). The relationships observed can be classified in two broad classifications: 
complementary and mutually exclusive relationships. Complementarities appear when 
corporate priorities are positively correlated with other, less important, corporate dimensions. 
Consequently, an external observer can perform a diagnostic of the organizational activities 
by summarizing the position of the organization in these central attributes (Porac et al., 
1995). Further, mutually exclusive defines the internal relationship among competitive 
priorities. Due to the scarcity of resources, managers make choices regarding which priorities 
should be outweighed. So, based on their relative importance, firms are compelled to make 
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trade-offs between a number of priorities. Importantly, these trade-offs are explained by the 
characteristics of the technology employed by the firm (Schroeder et al., 1995). 
Competitive priorities can be summarized with the use of production functions. The 
existence of strategies imply that managers choose some conversion mechanism relating the 
inputs – resources committed – to outputs – dimensions of the scope of strategy (Day et al., 
1995). In such a conversion mechanism or production function, the marginal relations – the 
slope of that function – reveal the relative importance of each strategic dimension and the 
trade-offs between two strategic dimensions (Prior and Surroca, 2006). Therefore, a strategic 
group distinguishes a set of firms with similarities in the marginal contribution of their 
strategic decision variables to the overall corporate strategy.  
From the preceding discussion, the following points stand out: a) managers’ mental 
models are simplifications of a complex reality; b) competitive priorities are at the center of 
the mental models; c) these central dimensions are viewed as critical for firm success; d) the 
identification of SGs are based on these competitive priorities and, finally, e) firms in the 
same SG choose to compete on the basis of similar competitive priorities. Given such a 
conception of SGs, in the next section we explain how to use DEA models in order to identify 
competitive priorities. 
USING DEA TO ASSIGN WEIGHTS TO EACH STABLE STRATEGIC GROUP  
As mentioned earlier, we use DEA methods to determine the efficiency in the 
implementation of the strategy and to assess the relative importance managers place on the 
key decision variables. This section illustrates graphically the marginal variables and 
efficiency values yielded by the DEA methods (technical details of these methods can be 
found in Appendix 1).  
A DEA model does not try to estimate the exact form of the production function, but it 
uses the existing observations (Decision Making Units, henceforth DMUs) to elaborate a non-
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parametric empirical frontier that envelopes all observations. Applying DEA, we obtain an 
efficiency value for each DMU which measures the distance separating a specific DMU from 
the frontier. The DMUs that define the frontier are Pareto-efficient and the rest are projected 
towards the frontier.  
No specific transformation function relating inputs and outputs is imposed; neither 
does it require knowing the weights associated with the above-mentioned variables. 
Precisely, and by means of a dual transformation of the mathematical programs, it becomes 
possible to assign a flexible set of weights to each input and output. These weights indicate 
the marginal contribution of each input/output to efficiency value yielded by the DEA. Also, 
as weights are dependent on the units of measurement, normalized or virtual weights can be 
used to assess such a contribution in a dimensionless way. Then, from a strategy viewpoint, 
the size of the virtual weights identify managers’ preference among dimensions in corporate 
strategy. 
According to Tulkens’s (1986) taxonomy, the standard DEA models follow what is 
so-called a contemporaneous evaluation, as illustrated by means of Panel A in Figure 1. The 
most important feature of this evaluation is the absolute independence of the technology 
between time periods t and t+1. So, it is possible to evaluate the transformation process of 
inputs into outputs each period, with no need to assume any technological relationship 
between two adjacent time periods. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
When time periods are connected, the result is what Tulkens (1986) defines as 
intertemporal evaluation (represented in Panel B of Figure 1). An intertemporal evaluation 
assumes a unique reference technology, used to evaluate each DMU in every time period 
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(represented by dotted lines in Figure 2) obtaining as many efficiency coefficients as the time 
periods considered for each DMU, but with no temporal connection among them.  
Although interested in the intertemporal evaluation, we are looking for stable 
efficiency figures, representative of the complete time period under analysis. This is possible 
in maintaining the intertemporal reference technology, but evaluating the aggregate level of 
the resources and scope variables (what is represented by the bold arrows in panel 2 of Figure 
1 and the program [3] in Appendix 1). In doing this, we obtain a long run stable efficiency 
coefficient, representative of the transformation process corresponding to the complete time-
period. 
We now present a simple example. Figure 2 depicts the contemporaneous frontiers 
corresponding to time periods t (Panel A) and t+1 (Panel B), assuming a transformation 
process with two dimensions of scope (y1 and y2) and one resource committed (x). As can be 
seen, some DMUs maintain a stable position in the two time periods (units B, C and D) but 
other units (A and E) move their respective strategic variables. This implies that the 
contemporaneous frontiers have different shapes. From the contemporaneous perspective, 
nothing can be done to connect them. In time period t, units A, B, C and D are efficient while 
unit E is inefficient. Moreover, the slope of the frontier at the point where each DMU is 
projected represents the rate between output weights – the marginal rate of transformation. In 
Panel B we see the same efficient units, noting the movement in the strategic variables for A 
and E.  
According to the proposal by Tulkens (1986), Figure 3 presents the intertemporal 
analysis – see also program [2] in Appendix 1. Observe that, although moving its strategic 
mix between t and t 1+ , unit A continues appearing efficient in both time periods, but the 
weights attached to this unit differ substantially across those time periods; ( )2 1t tu u− , in t, 
and ( )1 12 1t tu u+ +− , in t 1+ .  
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--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Our proposal is to sort out the temporal inconsistency of the weights consists in 
considering the aggregation of the subsequent contemporaneous production possibilities set – 
see program [3] in Appendix 1. The implicit assumptions of this proposal are i) the aggregate 
production possibilities set fulfil convexity and monotonicity (Varian, 1992 and Banker and 
Thrall, 1992), ii) the aggregate production set satisfies the free input and output disposability 
condition, and iii) the technological prevalence of constant returns to scale – the only 
economic assumption reasonable in the long run (Varian, 1992).  
Figure 4 illustrates our proposal. When we aggregate variables corresponding to t 
and t 1+ , units B, C and D continue appearing as efficient. Contrarily, this aggregation drives 
DMU A to be considered inefficient. This means, that our proposal of stable long-run 
evaluation is more demanding than the intertemporal frontier because it requires the joint 
accomplishment of two properties: 1) to be efficient on a long-run basis (as with units A, B, C 
and D), and 2) to be consistent with the importance given to the variables used (which only 
units B, C and D accomplish).  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
The proposal described is a new contribution to the panel data efficiency evaluation 
literature because, being well-grounded in the microeconomic concept of aggregate 
production possibilities set, it assigns a single efficiency coefficient and a temporal consistent 
set of weights to each firm.  
DESCRIPTION OF THE SPANISH SAVINGS BANK STRATEGIC DATA 
The information used in this study has been taken from the publication “Anuario 
Estadístico de las Cajas de Ahorros Confederadas” (Statistical Yearbook of the Confederated 
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Savings Banks) published by “Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros” (Spanish 
Confederation of Savings Banks). Due to the characteristics of the available information, our 
application is restricted to the time-period from 1998 to 2002. After deleting the savings 
banks with missing data, those involved in mergers and the extreme observations, our 
complete panel data included 42 firms. 
In the empirical application, we follow the taxonomy proposed by Hofer and Schendel 
(1978) and later applied by Cool and Schendel (1987) and Mehra (1996). This approach 
focuses on firms’ strategies by examining their scope and resource deployments. Following 
this proposal, we take variables generally used in previous studies devoted to the 
identification of SGs in the banking industry (see, for instance, Mehra, 1996, in the US 
banking sector, Canals, 1993, in the Spanish banking industry, and Gual and Vives, 1992, in 
the Spanish savings bank sector). So, the multi-product nature of a banking firm is measured 
in three global aspects: 1) product scope, 2) geographical reach and 3) customer proximity. 
The Product scope dimension is captured by six variables: commercial loans (S1), portfolio 
of securities (S2), treasury (S3), service commissions (S4), savings and deposit accounts (S5), 
and interbanking position (S6). The commercial loans measure is the ratio of commercial 
loans to financial investments, and it captures the bank’s specialization in domestic 
economies and small and medium firms. We measure the firm’s orientation towards active 
investments in stock market by the ratio of portfolio of securities to financial investments. 
The treasury variable is the ratio of liquid assets to financial investments, and it is indicative 
of the conservatism attitude of the bank. The service commissions measure is the ratio of 
commissions due to financial services to products of financial activity. This measure captures 
a firm’s diversification away from the traditional banking products (loans and savings) 
towards new services and financial intermediation. The savings and deposit accounts variable 
is the savings and deposit accounts of the private sector divided by the total liabilities; thus, a 
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small value for this ratio indicates a traditional and conservative banking business, based on 
the traditional accumulation of family savings. Finally, the interbanking position is the ratio 
of net position in financial markets to total liabilities, which is designed to capture the novel 
and aggressive way of capturing funds by means of the interbank market. 
We defined Geographical reach using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index. This index is 
obtained by squaring the ratio of the number of branches of each bank in every Spanish 
province to the total number of bank branches, and then summing those squares. Formally, 
the index is defined as:  
 ( ) ;32 2ij i
j 1
H N N 0 H 1
=
= ≤ ≤∑   
where ijN  is the number of branches of the savings bank evaluated in province j and iN  is 
the total number of branches of the bank. Then, we use the following measure of 
geographical reach in the DEA evaluation: 
 ( )7 :1 1 32 2ij i
j 1
S H N N
=
− = −∑   
The Proximity to customers variable is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
corresponding to the market quota of each firm i within each province ( )j j 1,...,32= . More 
specifically, the variable is defined as: 
 S8: ( )32 2ij j
j 1
N N
=
∑   
where ijN  is the number of branches in province j for the DMU under evaluation and jN  is 
the total number of branches in each province. 
To determine the characteristics of the inputs, we define three variables measuring a 
firm’s resource commitments: physical capital (R1), human capital (R3) and credit quality 
(R3). Physical capital is measured by the ratio of the depreciation and amortization expenses 
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to operating income; the human capital measure is personnel expenses divided by operating 
income; and the credit quality is the ratio of loan loss provisions and write-offs to operating 
income. 
ANALYSIS 
To identify SGs, we follow a six-step procedure, which is an adaptation of the 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas’s (1990, 1993) proposal to the features of efficiency evaluation. 
The first step is to identify the contemporaneous importance of each strategic dimension. This 
is executed by identifying the virtual weights of inputs and outputs of each firm applying 
program [2].  
To see to what extent the assumption of the existence of strategic groups over the time 
period analyzed can be accepted, in the second step we follow Cool and Schendel (1987) and 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990, 1993) to test the hypothesis of the existence of stable 
strategic time periods (SSTPs). To identify the time periods, we analyze changes in the means 
and variance-covariance matrices of the virtual weights, using four methods: a) applying 
Bartlett’s test for the equality of the covariance matrices; and b) testing the equivalence of the 
means using three methods, viz. Wilks’ lambda, Hotelling-Lawley’s trace, and Pillai’s trace. 
[1] Once the SSTPs hypothesis is accepted, the analysis of similar strategic groups becomes 
meaningful (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990, 1993).  
In the third step, following Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992) we test for the homogeneity 
of the technology over the years included in each SSTP. For two contemporaneous frontiers, 
to be identical, the probability distribution functions of efficiency values in t  and in t 1+  
should coincide. Then, if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, efficiency values and virtual 
weights of the years t  and t 1+  can be measured relative to a pooled frontier.  
In the fourth step, for each SSTPs identified in step 2, an intertemporal efficiency 
evaluation is performed and the stable long-run virtual weights are obtained.  
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In the fifth step, Cluster Analysis of the stable long-run virtual weights is performed. 
To overcome the distortions highlighted by Ketchen and Shook (1996), we use a two-stage 
process. In the first stage, a Ward hierarchical algorithm is used to define the number of 
clusters. For a correct identification of the number of clusters, the procedure proposed by 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1993, p. 83) is employed. In the second stage, each firm is 
assigned to a group using the K-means iterative partitioning algorithm. To examine whether 
differences in the selected dimensions exist among SGs, a MANOVA is carried out. 
Differences among groups for each variable are verified using ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis 
test. Additionally, we use Discriminant Analysis to verify the level of separation across SGs 
and the robustness of the segmentation. 
In the sixth step, we verify the superiority of our proposal for determining SGs when 
explaining the variability of profits. Following Mehra (1996,) we conduct a univariate 
ANOVA test to examine the association between SG membership and various performance 
indicators. 
After this, we replicate the process of identifying SGs (specifically, steps two, five and 
six) using the original variables. Doing this we verify to what extent our proposal offers 
better results than the standard application of Cluster Analysis with the original variables. 
FINDINGS 
The Identification of Stable Strategic Time Periods 
In order to identify the so-called stable strategic time periods (SSTPs), the 
methodology described is applied to both the contemporaneous virtual weights and to the 
original strategic variables. The results are shown in Table I. The results indicate that, when 
considering virtual weights, no significant changes, either in the vector of means or in the 
variance-covariance matrix, occur throughout the years. So, between 1998 and 2002, the 
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savings bank sector maintained stability in the managers’ perceptions of which strategic 
dimensions are more relevant.  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
When we consider the original strategic dimensions (say, variables instead of their 
normalized weights), we observe changes in the mean vectors and variance-covariance matrix 
results of SSTP analysis. The changes in the vector of means are significant for every year. 
On the other hand, comparisons of the covariance matrices between each pair of years show 
no change. According to Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990, p. 204), for the accurate 
determination of SSTPs in such situations, the results from the two methods must be 
examined. Based upon the intersection of the two criteria, it can be inferred that five SSTPs 
are observed during the 1998-02 time period. However, for purposes of comparison, 
whenever we refer to SSTPs identification based on the original strategic variables, we will 
consider both the 5-SSTPs and the 1-SSTP specifications.  
Once the SSTP-virtual weights are established, the homogeneity of technologies 
during the 1998-02 time period is tested. Table II shows the results of the test and supports 
the null hypothesis that the mean (ANOVA), the distribution functions (Kruskal-Wallis) and 
the median (Wilcoxon) of the efficiency coefficient between each pair of years are 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, we can assume the use of the same technology for each 
year. Two important implications follow. Firstly, the differences in the efficiency coefficient 
as well as in the virtual weights are not attributed to production frontier differences. 
Secondly, the profitability and efficiency differentials amongst firms come from areas other 
than the process of transforming inputs into outputs: the preferences of managers (Elyasiani 
and Mehdian, 1992).  
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--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Strategic Groups in the Spanish Banking Industry 
Once the SSTPs and technological homogeneity are established, Cluster Analysis is 
performed. Results for the inter-temporal virtual weights stratification are shown in Table III. 
The detailed composition of SGs –both when clustering virtual weights and original strategic 
variables– is tabulated in Appendix 2.[2]  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
The inspection of the centroids of each SG reveals that SG1 shows a preference for S2, 
the portfolio of securities, and S3, treasury. This implies that the savings banks in SG1 play 
an important role as bankers to small and medium size businesses. It is worth noting that 
credit activity, S1, is regarded with little importance in the strategy of the firms belonging to 
this group. SG1 is also characterized by a focus on attracting funds by means of aggressive 
formulas, such as inter-banking funds, S6. Savings banks in this group give weight to 
participating in a greater number of geographical markets, S7, despite the reduced value of 
the market quota in each market, S8. This pattern bears closely the characteristics of 
business/corporate banking; thus we can label SG1 as investment savings banks. This 
characterization is reaffirmed when it is noted that the valuation of human capital, R2, is 
lower while the importance attached to physical capital, R1, is high. 
SG2 can be labeled as asset savings banks group. Here we found firms that attach 
importance to commercial loans, S1. As far as the strategy concerning liabilities is concerned, 
the savings and deposit accounts, S5, and the inter-banking funds, S6, are similar to those of 
the rest of the sector.  
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The two biggest savings bank entities in Spain (La Caixa and Caja Madrid) belong to 
SG3. The emphasis in this group is on proximity to customers, S8, and savings and deposit 
accounts, S5. Firms in SG3 have a very high proportion of earnings from financial services, 
S4, rather than from loans or corporate investments. Despite the size of some firms in this 
group, no special emphasis is put on physical assets, R1 because SG3 attaches importance to 
human capital, R2. Summing up, the strategy in SG3 is focused on maximizing market quota, 
S8, principally by means of conservative formulas for capturing funds such as savings and 
deposit accounts, S5, and, then, by charging commission for supplying financial services, S4. 
Thus the role of employees, R2, becomes particularly relevant. We can refer to SG3 as 
passive/liability savings banks. 
When we analyze the performance implications of SG membership, we observe in 
Table IV that the selected performance indicators perfectly differentiate across groups.[3] 
More specifically, the ANOVA test shows that groups formed by clustering the stable long-
run virtual weights exhibit significant differences for every indicator we use. Additionally, 
Table IV shows that members of SG3 have the better results. This result could be interpreted 
as a change in the traditional business orientation of Spanish savings banks: originally, 
savings banks were orientated towards an active strategy of supplying commercial loans to a 
wide portfolio of customers. Now, the strategy has shifted to emphasize capturing an 
increasing number of clients and providing them with financial services. This pattern is very 
well represented by SG3. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Performance Analysis 
Strategic group theory suggests that, in addition to industry-source and firm specific-
source, long-lasting firm profitability derives from the structure of the industry. In this 
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structure, SG membership is the variable used to explain the persistent differences in the 
performance of the firms. Our goal here is to examine to what extent a statistical association 
between group membership and performance indicators can be found. Following Mehra 
(1996), a univariate ANOVA test is conducted to examine the association between the 
structure of the industry and the 1998-02 average performance of savings banks. To study the 
extent of the variability of the indicators that can be explained by SG membership, R2 figures 
are computed for all performance indicators. Column 1 in Table V presents the results of our 
proposal, whereas the results of the traditional application of Cluster Analysis to the initial 
key decision variables are shown in columns 2 (for the 5 SSTPs specification) and 3 (for the 1 
SSTP specification). As a resume, Table V illustrates the superiority of our proposal in 
explaining performance variability.  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
It is evident from the results that SGs based on virtual weights show significant 
differences across all performance indicators, although it is also true that the R2 values are 
low for the traditional performance indicators (ROA and ROE). This situation can be 
explained, on the one hand, by the idiosyncratic not-for-profit status of Spanish savings 
banks. On the other hand, the competition from other banks, namely commercial banks, puts 
pressure on savings banks, forcing them to attain similar levels of efficiency to the 
competitors (Kumbhakar et al., 2001). This explains why savings banks exhibit high R2 
values for those indicators proposed by the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks –
prevalent when Spanish analysts and practitioners determine league tables– which are related 
to efficiency, such as the Cost / Income ratio or the so-called ‘efficiency ratio’, say Ordinary 
Margin / Operative Costs. 
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When we examine the average values of selected performance indicators, the 
stratification based on stable virtual weights exhibits a stronger fit: 8% of the ROA variance, 
almost 10% of the ROE variance, 7.5% of the gross profit / ordinary margin ratio variance, 
upwards of 24% of the cost / income ratio variance, almost 15% of the ‘efficiency ratio’ 
variance, more than 13% of the employee productivity ratio, and 10% of the profit to loans 
ratio variance. 
The capacity to explain the variability of the performance of SGs based on the 
stratification of the original strategic variables is considerably lower, particularly when 1-
SSTP is considered. Pairwise comparison (1-SSTP vs 5-SSTP) shows a better fit for the 5-
SSTPs, a situation quite predictable because this is the solution identified as more desirable. 
In summary, the general conclusion that can be drawn from our results is that the 
stratification of savings banks according the managers’ perceptions exhibits a stronger fit. 
Indeed, the ability of SGs based on virtual weights to explain differences in performance is 
higher when long-term results (say, average performance indicators) are considered. These 
results reinforce the thesis of cognitive forces driving the process of SG formation, conferring 
more stability and explaining a higher percentage of intra-industry performance variance than 
the traditional way of clustering units on the original strategic variables. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of strategic group has merited a great deal of attention within the 
strategic management and industrial organization literature (McGee and Thomas, 1986). But 
the debate in the literature about how strategic groups should be identified (Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1990) goes on unabated. To address this limitation, this study has developed a 
framework for identifying SGs, and applied it to test whether the hypothesis of no differences 
in performance across groups and through the years can be supported. The paper has also 
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proven empirically that this framework has a greater ability to explain intra-industry 
performance differences than the traditional analysis.  
The basic proposition of this paper is that firms use given inputs in order to achieve 
certain results, and do so following different strategies. From this, it follows that firms in the 
same group convert inputs into outputs in the same way and, consequently, a SG can be 
defined as a set of firms that value inputs and outputs in the same way. From this valuation, 
we are able to approximate the cognitive models of managers through a simple criterion. In 
this context, DEA is an excellent tool for segmentation since the virtual weights provided are 
informative of the system of priorities of managers.  
The very notion of SGs requires the existence of consistence and stability when 
analysed over a specified time period. The problem is that, irrespective of the time period 
considered, the existent DEA programs give a time-specific efficiency coefficient and time-
specific weights what, in fact, supports the hypothesis of lack of SGs. From the theoretical 
point of view, this article presents and discusses the advantages of the definition of a stable 
DEA model focused on the long-run evaluation including the inputs and outputs 
corresponding to the global period under analysis.  
From the applied section of the article, we have tested the proposed method through 
the study of the Spanish banking industry. The results indicate the potential contribution of 
our proposal towards a better understanding of the characteristics of SGs. To verify this, we 
have studied the ability of the identified strategic groups to maximize between-groups 
differences. Differences between SGs are observed for all the specified performance 
indicators. In order to increase the knowledge about the properties of our proposal, we 
compared the SGs composition we have obtained with the one obtained by traditionally 
running Cluster Analysis with the strategic variables. The results clearly state that 
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segmentation on the basis of virtual weights exhibits a stronger fit and explains a more 
substantial percentage of intra-industry long-term performance variance. 
Although the SGs determined via long-run efficiency evaluation explain a better 
proportion of the differences in profitability, an important part of the variability is yet to be 
explained. This result shows that, apart from the industry-effect and the SG-effect, there is 
clearly a firm specific effect that explains some of the differences in profitability. So, when 
trying to explain to what extent we can understand the variability of profitability among 
firms, the internal efficiency of firms continues to play a crucial role.  
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NOTES 
[1] The procedure which we propose to test whether virtual weights are stable introduces a 
subtle difference with what Cool and Schendel (1987) proposed: we do not pool the data 
of t and t+1 when no significant differences are found between these two years. The 
reason not to do this is simple: the frontier obtained from contemporaneous DEA 
evaluation is very different from that obtained from the intertemporal evaluation. Hence, 
we propose to test the null hypothesis of equality of the covariance matrix between each 
pair of periods. 
[2] Full details of the results of cluster analysis of the original strategic variables may be 
obtained from the authors. To obtain the SGs when imposing the 1-SSTP solution for the 
original strategic variables, we follow the proposal of Cool and Schendel (1987): the 
strategy variables are averaged over the 5 years for each sampled firm. 
[3] The ANOVA analysis used to test the significance of the performance indicators among the 
SGs identified with the original variables shown that two indicators are not significant 
(RNE and RNC), and that only one indicator is significant at 10% (ROA). The remaining 
indicators are only significant at 5% 
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Table I. SSTP determination: Virtual weights versus key decision variables 
PANEL A. Differences on the contemporaneous virtual weights 
 
Null hypothesis Bartlett’s Test Pillai’s Trace Wilks’ Lambda Hotelling-Lawley Trace 
     
1998 1999Σ = Σ  12.985 (1.233) 
0.068 
(1.518) 
0.932 
(1.518) 
0.073 
(1.518) 
1999 2000Σ = Σ  9.478 (0.900) 
0.074 
(1.651) 
0.926 
(1.651) 
0.080 
(1.651) 
2000 2001Σ = Σ  12.426 (1.180) 
0.054 
(1.180) 
0.946 
(1.180) 
0.057 
(1.180) 
2001 2002Σ = Σ  2.752 (0.261) 
0.011 
(0.223) 
0.989 
(0.223) 
0.011 
(0.223) 
     
PANEL B. Differences on the original key decision variables 
     
Null hypothesis Bartlett’s Test Pillai’s Trace Wilks’ Lambda Hotelling-Lawley Trace 
     
1998 1999Σ = Σ  42.263 (0.554) 
0.470 
(6.131)*** 
0.530 
(6.131)*** 
0.887 
(6.131)*** 
1999 2000Σ = Σ  35.116 (0.460) 
0.414 
(4.886)*** 
0.586 
4.886)*** 
0.707 
(4.886)*** 
2000 2001Σ = Σ  39.366 (0.516) 
0.445 
(5.541)*** 
0.555 
(5.541)*** 
0.802 
(5.541)*** 
2001 2002Σ = Σ  33.415 (0.438) 
0.238 
(2.154)** 
0.762 
(2.154)** 
0.312 
(2.154)** 
     
Notes: F values are seen in parentheses. In Bartlett’s Test, Σ  denotes the variance-
covariance matrix. In the other tests, Σ  denotes the vector of means. 
***/**/* Significant differences at a 1% / 5% / 10% level. 
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Table II. Statistical test of equal technologies between t  and 1t +  
 ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis Wilcoxon 
Test of contemporaneous 
technologies 
F 
(Prob > F) 
x 
(Prob > x) 
Z 
(Prob > Z) 
    
Year 1998 – Year 1999 0.051 
(0.821) 
0.297 
(0.586) 
-0,282 
(0,778) 
Year 1999 – Year 2000 0.117 
(0.733) 
0.217 
(0.641) 
-0,501 
(0,616) 
Year 2000 – Year 2001 0.344 
(0.559) 
0.254 
(0.614) 
-0,724 
(0,469) 
Year 2001 – Year 2002 0.335 
(0.564) 
0.274 
(0.601) 
-0,698 
(0,485) 
Among all years 1,053 
(0.381) 
2.391 
(0.664) 
- 
    
 
 
Table III. Characterization of strategic groups based on cluster virtual weights 
MANOVA; F (Wilks) = 15.738 (p =0.000). Discriminant Analysis correctly classifies 100% of the sample Strategic groups 
Strategic Groups  ANOVA  Kruskal-Wallis  1 2 3 Total  F test p-Value  Chi-sq. p-Value 
Output virtual weights:           
Commercial loans 0.0471 0.4968 0.0654 0.2875  71.8923 0.0000  31.8759 0.0000 
 (0.0963) (0.1289) (0.1126) (0.2507)       
Portfolio of securities 0.2299 0.0420 0.1266 0.1044  6.9692 0.0026  6.8970 0.0318 
 (0.2271) (0.0512) (0.1355) (0.1468)       
Treasury 0.1029 0.0386 0.0319 0.0506  5.1495 0.0104  3.0605 0.2165 
 (0.1014) (0.0374) (0.0281) (0.0607)       
Service commissions 0.2056 0.0808 0.2955 0.1638  9.7751 0.0004  12.0440 0.0024 
 (0.1813) (0.0877) (0.1702) (0.1617)       
Savings & Deposit accounts 0.0230 0.0366 0.0372 0.0338  0.1233 0.8844  0.8543 0.6524 
 (0.0691) (0.0737) (0.0770) (0.0721)       
Interbank position  0.0837 0.0855 0.0758 0.0825  0.0378 0.9629  0.2210 0.8954 
 (0.0968) (0.1077) (0.0658) (0.0940)       
Geographical reach 0.1317 0.0205 0.0401 0.0495  4.0368 0.0255  6.6787 0.0355 
 (0.1492) (0.0676) (0.1066) (0.1068)       
Proximity to customers 0.0378 0.0807 0.2400 0.1132  5.9933 0.0054  6.7458 0.0343 
 (0.0730) (0.1150) (0.2230) (0.1615)       
           
Input virtual weights:           
Physical capital 0.5727 0.1739 0.0485 0.2265  38.3875 0.0000  23.2493 0.0000 
 (0.1626) (0.1528) (0.0735) (0.2339)       
Human capital 0.3086 0.7721 0.8864 0.7027  37.2642 0.0000  21.7717 0.0000 
 (0.1615) (0.1808) (0.0925) (0.2639)       
Credit quality 0.1187 0.0540 0.0651 0.0708  3.2556 0.0493  3.3511 0.1872 
 (0.0914) (0.0539) (0.0594) (0.0681)       
           
Number of savings banks 9 22 11 42       
Note: Standard deviations are seen in parentheses 
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Table IV. Performance characterization of strategic groups based on cluster virtual weights 
 Strategic groups ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis 
Indicators of performance: 1 2 3 Total F test p-Value Chi-sq. p-Value 
         
ROA: Profit / total assets 0.0085 0.0086 0.0103 0.0090 6.2317 0.0024 6.3083 0.0427 
 (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0033)     
ROE: Profit / equity 0.1343 0.1518 0.1578 0.1496 5.4303 0.0050 12.9255 0.0016 
 (0.0354) (0.0412) (0.0283) (0.0378)     
GP/OM: Profit / ordinary margin 0.3187 0.3123 0.3645 0.3273 5.5675 0.0044 9.1710 0.0102 
 (0.1044) (0.0824) (0.1157) (0.0989)     
CI: Cost / income 0.5932 0.5615 0.4945 0.5507 26.5845 0.0000 48.7314 0.0000 
 (0.0966) (0.0590) (0.0684) (0.0792)     
ER: Efficiency ratio 0.6443 0.6209 0.5654 0.6114 14.2267 0.0000 32.5141 0.0000 
 (0.1009) (0.0670) (0.0790) (0.0832)     
RNE: Profit / Number employees 30.6847 29.3377 43.3026 33.2838 9.6008 0.0001 12.1724 0.0023 
 (15.4507) (14.6977) (23.9509) (18.6114)     
RNC: Profit / loans 0.0145 0.0136 0.0178 0.0149 8.3928 0.0003 10.6054 0.0050 
 (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0065)     
Number of savings banks 9 22 11 42     
         
Note: Standard deviations are seen in parentheses 
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Table V. ANOVA R2 fit for individual performance indicators 
Key decision variables 
 
Virtual weights 
(1 SSTP solution) 5 SSTPs solution 1 SSTP solution 
     
ROA Profits / total assets  0.0802 0.0345 0.0362 
  (0.0339) (0.2252) (0.2244) 
ROE Profits / equity  0.0960 0.0779 0.0674 
  (0.0168) (0.0319) (0.0593) 
GP_OM Profits / ordinary margin 0.0753 0.0685 0.0317 
  (0.0420) (0.0489) (0.2710) 
CI Cost / income 0.2436 0.0926 0.0334 
  (0.0000) (0.0161) (0.2527) 
ER Efficiency ratio 0.1490 0.1149 0.0487 
  (0.0015) (0.0056) (0.1326) 
RNE Profit / Number employees 0.1339 0.0393 0.0472 
  (0.0606) (0.4395) (0.3895) 
RNC Profit / loans 0.1061 0.0156 0.0051 
  (0.0106) (0.5129) (0.8132) 
     
Notes: The significance level of the F values is shown in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Contemporaneous analysis and stable long-run analysis of firm’s strategy 
PANEL A. Contemporaneous analysis of firm’s strategy 
 
 
 
 
PANEL B. Stable long-run analysis of firm’s strategy 
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Figure 2. Contemporaneous DEA frontier  
 
PANEL A. Frontier in (t) 
 
 
PANEL B. Frontier in (t + 1) 
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Figure 3. Intertemporal DEA frontier in t and t+1  
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Figure 4. Intertemporal long-run DEA frontier with stable set of weights for t and t+1  
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APPENDIX 1. FORMULATING THE LONG-RUN DEA EFFICIENCY 
EVALUATION TO ASSIGN STABLE VIRTUAL WEIGHTS 
 
Introducing some notation, assume that for S units ( )1,...,s S=  there are N inputs 
( ),..., ,...,s s s s N1 n Nx x x x +⎡ ⎤= ∈ℜ⎣ ⎦  producing M outputs ( ),..., ,...,s s s s M1 m My y y y +⎡ ⎤= ∈ℜ⎣ ⎦ . Let 
( ),..., ,...,o o o o N1 n Nx x x x +⎡ ⎤= ∈ℜ⎣ ⎦  and ( ),..., ,...,o o o o M1 m My y y y +⎡ ⎤= ∈ℜ⎣ ⎦  denote the variables 
corresponding to the DMU under analysis. With panel data, lets define a new variable t 
( ),...,t 1 T=  representing the time period when the inputs and outputs were measured: 
( ), , , ,,..., ,...,s t s t s t s t N1 n Nx x x x +⎡ ⎤= ∈ℜ⎣ ⎦  and ( ), , , ,,..., ,...,s t s t s t s t M1 m My y y y +⎡ ⎤= ∈ℜ⎣ ⎦ . Using the taxonomy 
introduced by Tulkens (1986), the following mathematical program gives the so-called 
contemporaneous frontier efficiency coefficient  (evaluating each DMU T times): 
 
, ,
, , ,
, ,
, , , ,
, ,
;
.
, ; ,..., ; ,..., .
c t c t
m n
M
c t c t o t
m m
u ,v m=1
N
c t o t
n n
n=1
M N
c t s t c t s t
m m n n
m=1 n=1
c t c t
m n
Max       h = u y
      s. t.     v x 1
u y v x 0 ;   s = 1,...,S  
u v 0 m 1 M n 1 N
=
− ≤
≥ = =
∑
∑
∑ ∑
 [1] 
Where ,c tmu and 
,c t
nv  are the contemporaneous input and output weights corresponding, 
for period t, to the DMU under evaluation. The problem with the contemporaneous frontier is 
that we have a time-specific frontier and a time-specific efficiency coefficient. So, for DMU 
‘o’, we obtain T contemporaneous efficiency coefficients ( ), , ,,..., ,...,c 1 c t c Th h h , T M×  output 
weights, ( ), , , ,,..., ,..., ,...,c 1 c T c 1 c T1 1 M Mu u u u , and T N×  input weights, ( ), , , ,,..., ,..., ,...,c 1 c T c 1 c T1 1 N Nv v v v .  
To connect the time periods, we can use what Tulkens refers as intertemporal frontier, 
defined in the following program: 
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 [2] 
In applying the intertemporal frontier, it is assumed the technology is invariant for all 
the time-periods. However, for each DMU we have T efficiency coefficients 
( )', ', ',,..., ,...,i 1 i t i Th h h , T M×  output weights, ( )', ', ', ',,..., ,..., ,...,i 1 i T i 1 i T1 1 M Mu u u u , and T N×  input 
weights, ( )', ', ', ',,..., ,..., ,...,i 1 i T i 1 i T1 1 N Nv v v v . Obviously, the consistency of the weights over different 
time-periods is not granted in advance. 
To resolve the limitations pointed out, we propose a new stable long-run DEA 
evaluation. Among the desirable properties, our proposal offers a stable common set of 
weights for the complete time-period. The program that gives us the stable long-run DEA 
weights is: 
 
'' ''
'' '' ,
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 [3] 
Applying program [3], we now have one long-run efficiency coefficient ( )"ih , M 
output weights, ( )" ",...,i i1 Mu u , and N input weights, ( )" ",...,i i1 Nv v  for each DMU. Besides the 
determination of the stable common set of weights, program [3] also has three additional 
properties: a) It is less dependent on the specific values of the variables in one particular year; 
b) It ensures that no changes in the valuation system takes place across time periods; and c) 
the aggregation does not implies any lost in information because the restrictions defining the 
technology of programs [2] and [3] are exactly the same. 
 36
APPENDIX 2. STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP OVER THE PERIOD 1998-02: 
SGs DEFINED WITH THE INTERTEMPORAL VIRTUAL WEIGHTS VERSUS SGs 
DEFINED WITH THE KEY DECISION VARIABLES  
 Virtual weights Key decision variables 
Saving bank 98-02 98 99 00 01 02 98-02
M.P. y C. General de A. de BADAJOZ 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
C.A. Municipal de BURGOS 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.A. Provincial de GUADALAJARA 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.A. de NAVARRA 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 
C.A. de SANTANDER Y CANTABRIA 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
CAJA SAN FERNANDO de SEVILLA y JEREZ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.A. Municipal de VIGO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.A. y M.P. de EXTREMADURA 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
C.A. de CASTILLA LA MANCHA 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
C.A. de CATALUNYA 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 
C.A. y M.P. de CÓRDOBA. CajaSur 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.E. de GIRONA 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C. General de A. GRANADA 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.A. de LA RIOJA 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.E. Comarcal de MANLLEU 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.A. y M.P. de las BALEARES 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C. Insular de A. de CANARIAS 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.E. de SABADELL 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C. General de A. de CANARIAS 2 3 3 1 3 3 3 
C.A. y M.P. de SEGOVIA 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.E. de TERRASSA 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.A. de Valencia, Castellón y Alicante. BANCAJA 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.A. y M.P. de ZARAGOZA ARAGÓN Y RIOJA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
C.A. de la INMACULADA DE ARAGÓN 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.A. del MEDITERRÁNEO 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.A. de GALICIA 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 
C. Provincial de A. de JAÉN 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.A. y M.P. de ÁVILA 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 
CAJA ESPAÑA de Inversiones 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
M.P. y C.A. de HUELVA y SEVILLA 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.A. de SALAMANCA y SORIA - Caja Duero 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
C.A. y M.P. de MADRID 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C.E. de MANRESA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.E. LAIETANA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C.A. de MURCIA 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 
C.A. de ASTURIAS 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 
C.E. del PENEDÉS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
BILBAO BIZKAIA KUTXA 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 
C.A. y M.P. de VITORIA y ALAVA. Caja Vital 3 1 3 1 3 3 3 
C.A. y Pensiones de BARCELONA - La Caixa 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
C.A. y M.P. de GIPUZKOA y SAN SEBASTIÁN 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
UNICAJA 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 
        
 
